HAVE WE NO AGENCY?

It is a common theme among Haitian and those who care about Haiti to reduce the complex and difficult challenges Haiti is facing and lay them at the feet of the International Community (IC) and the International Non Governmental Organizations (INGOs).  The latter term captures international organizations, local NGOs and what we all know as nonprofit organizations but it also includes religious ones and more.  While the terms are different and represent distinctly diverse organizations, for the purpose of brevity I will use NGO to include all organizations from NGOs to nonprofits. 

This paper makes the case that the evolving narrative that NGOs are at the roots of all evils in Haiti is flawed and at best incomplete. It asks the simple question: “have we no agency?” Do we not possess any control over and accountability for ourselves, and over what happens within our sovereign borders?

We also hear the claim that Haiti has over 10,000 NGOs – a number that is neither factual nor official but yet it is accepted as gospel.  In fact, there are less than 600 registered NGOs in Haiti.  However, the narrative is how these thousands of NGOs overtook Haiti, changed our social norms and turned us into beggars who will sell our souls for a kit or a bag of rice.  Undeniably, NGOs do indeed hand out bags of rice but we have somehow selectively forgotten the pictures of past Presidents throwing money to the crowd from their passing cars or current political leaders handing out cash-filled envelopes or bags of rice and plates of food.

While there is much one can contest in the claims about the NGOs role, I want to stay away from the details and focus on the macro level of the problem.  To that end, it would be a fair assessment to say that NGOs have helped expand the divide that had already existed between the Haitian state and its citizens.   For brevity’s sake I will forego our long history and start with the Duvalier regime to illustrate the widening divide.[1].”  This chasm expanded during the American occupation and was pushed further during President Francois Duvalier’s rule.  It broadened over the past 30 years and has resulted in what is today one of the most divided and unequal societies in the world.

We Have Choices: Failing to Use our Agency to Negotiate Better

A number of authors most notably Dambisa Moyo who wrote “Dead Aid” and professor William Easterly in his book “The White Men Burden” posit that the disaggregation and disconnect that is created by NGOs as the primary service providers is not benign but is in fact harmful for the democratic system.   How can a society build and reinforce its norms, and how can the state maintain its legitimacy and demand compliance when it is unable to bring people the basic commodities of goods and services they need?  Though I am mostly in agreement with those critics, I am unwilling to discharge ourselves for the choices we make.

The recent protests of July 6-8 2018 have brought the question of the role of the international community to the center stage, particularly as it relates to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  In short, the Haitian government negotiated and signed an agreement with the IMF which stipulated that Haiti would reduce its subsidy to the electrical power company (EDH) and increase its revenues by capturing the full profit on the sell of fuel.  In return for these steps and more, Haiti would have gained access to $96 million in grants and loans from the IC.  Despite being warned of the potential impact of such a decision, the Haitian government subsequently decided to increase fuel prices anyway by 38% and 50% respectively on gasoline, diesel and kerosene.   As expected, the country immediately erupted in demonstrations that lasted over three days and resulted in the loss of 24 lives, and the destruction and ransacking of many businesses (amounting in the millions). 

The agreed narrative is that the “blan” (literal translation for a white person but contextually used for any outsider) is manipulating Haiti.  It would reduce this transformative moment and keep the focus on the destruction, ransacking and on Haiti vs. the IMF/IC.  However, the events of July 6-8 have shown a story that is much more complex.  The very act of protesting is itself a confirmation of our agency. It says that we are human beings and when pushed too far we will push back.  The repercussions from this movement are still being felt today. A few weeks after the protests, the country learned of how its limited resources were being wasted and looted by the very elected representatives who were supposed to be looking out for the people’s well being.  Today, the political and economic class are singing different tunes and backing away from previous positions.  A new debate is opened on the issue of corruption and civil society is timidly beginning to ask for justice and accountability. These movements, while timid, are to be lauded and supported.

Our Agency and Governance

I mentioned the word agency a few times already and before going any further, I think it is worthwhile to deconstruct the term to ensure clarity because it essentially grounds my entire argument going forward.  The word agency is defined in social science as “the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. By contrast, structure is those factors of influence (such as social class, religion, gender, ethnicity, ability, customs, etc.) that determine or limit an agent and their decisions.”  Having agency simply means that things do not just happen to us. Instead we feel that we have some level of control and accountability over ourselves.

As I layout my argument against the point of view that claims our powerlessness, I have accepted that I will be labeled as a supporter and enabler of NGOs and a friend of the international community.  Unfortunately, that will have missed the point of this piece.  My thesis here is not to make the case for the goodness of NGOs or international donors.  Instead, it is to hold a mirror to ourselves in order to diagnose our problems so we can we tackle them, and play the game with the cards that we are dealt.

My view is that one of the fundamental problems we face is one of governance, which is essential to development but what exactly is “governance”?  The Webster dictionary defines governance as: the way that a city, company, etc., is controlled by the people who run it.  Some of the synonyms include: administration, care, conduct, control, direction, government, guidance, management, oversight, regulation, stewardship, and supervision.

The emphasis on governance implies the continued and transparent application of rules and practices to manage a business or the affairs of the state.  In the Haitian context it is what President Jovenel Moise identified as the five ills of the country “corruption, corruption, corruption, corruption, and corruption.”  According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), good governance is…

The process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realization of human rights in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law. The true test of "good" governance is the degree to which it delivers on the promise of human rights: civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. The key question is: are the institutions of governance effectively guaranteeing the right to health, adequate housing, sufficient food, quality education, fair justice and personal security?

The argument that centers on blaming the International Community and/or the NGOs for all of Haiti’s ills is certainly easier to make and one that is most likely to get broad affirmation.  This argument lacks nuance and leaves aside the issues of agency and good governance. It leads the reader to conclude that were it not for the IC or the NGOs, Haiti would have progressed.  It would claim the principal reason for the recent uprising of July 6th and 7th was that the people rose up against the overly powerful IMF, which controls our politicians.  That is indeed a powerful argument to make and one that would make any dissenter appear to be defending the IMF and surely appear unpatriotic.  This argument leaves little space for doubt and self-reflection. However, the reality is that, if asked, one would be hard pressed to find a single person who was protesting because of the IMF.  Instead, the people took to the streets to express their frustrations and resentment of the failed political system, and their anger and total rejection of the economic and political establishment.  The convergence of issues that led to July 6th clearly captures John Locke’s argument that “a social contract between a ruler and ruled can be rescinded by the latter if the government takes away property and enslaves people.” In such circumstances, “the People have a right to remove it by force.”

The Flaws of the Anti-NGO Argument

The emotions around the IC/NGO involvement are insidious and make for a powerful concoction that blinds even the clearest eyes and silences dissent. Even President Jovenel has been making the case against the NGOs despite knowing that nearly 60% of investments in Haiti come from said international community often through NGOs.  The President is often seen inaugurating buildings, roads, schools and clinics that are paid for by international donors.  Further, the administration has welcomed, for example, the support of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), which has disbursed more than one billion Gourdes (approx. 15 million US dollars) to its most strategic and flagship initiative the “Caravan of Change.”  In that instance the donor is not a culprit.  Ironically, right before the protests the government had been touting the international community’s endorsement of the caravan as proof that it had not only the right strategy to develop Haiti but also as a seal of approval of its good governance.

No matter the context, the problem remains whole and it is the chasm that exists between the state and the people.  To illustrate this point, dissenters have been asking for years that all NGOs leave Haiti. Therefore, I had expected that they would welcome Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) recent closing of the maternity hospital in Delmas 33.  In addition, in the coming months MSF has plans to shut down another hospital – a 122-bed trauma center in Tabarre.  I honestly had expected a celebration of the departure of MSF but there wasn't any. Of course, I understand the dilemma.  We all know that Haiti’s health system is weak.  In the most recent fiscal budget the government allocated less than 6 billion Gourdes to the health sector in contrast to the 7.2 billion Gourdes allocated to the Parliament.  In that same budget they had the following allocations: the Primature (2 billion); the Presidency (1.46 billion); the Ministry of Commerce (1.6 billion); the Ministry of Culture (1.38 billion); the Ministry of the Environment (757 million); the Ministry of Tourism (739 million); the Ministry of Defense (514 million); the Ministry of Communication (350 million); the Ministry of Cults (193 million); the Ministry of Haitians living abroad (127 million).

A 2017 World Bank Group study show that “the annual per capita public health spending in Haiti is $13, compared with $781 in nearby Cuba and $180 in the Dominican Republic.” In fact, only one-fourth of births are attended by a skilled health professional. Most rural areas have no access to health care, making residents susceptible to otherwise treatable diseases.  Given these facts, clearly no one would come out to celebrate the closing of a free round-the-clock maternity hospital. 

How to balance the NGO Relationship

I believe that reasonable people can agree that Haiti needs to wind down its dependency on foreign aid.  However, there are other models of how to engage with the sector to promote our own strategy. The first example is Rwanda, which did not kick out all NGOs but instead developed a process that moved NGOs from post disaster relief responders to partners in the country’s development strategy.  

In the post-genocide context, the first order of business was to save as many lives as possible.  Similar to Haiti, that period was also rife with confusion and resulted in the waste of a lot of resources.  However, Rwanda has since established its own development strategy, strengthen its governance structures and engage NGOs as partners in its development efforts with a focus on capacity building.  Today, Rwanda is not only stable, its economy is growing and it is considered a model for other developing countries.

Closer to home the commune of Delmas, whose mayor is Mr. Wilson Jeudy, is illustrative of a leader who has been able to engage the IC, NGOs and NGOs in projects that benefit his community. His approach, similar to Rwanda, is not one of antagonism. Whether it is the PRODEPUR project financed by the world bank to rebuild homes and provide access to basic services in Delmas 32, or the British Red Cross building of Canals, marketplaces, paving, drainage, community clinics and installing solar panels street lighting in the areas of Delmas 19 or USAID Lokal + projects.  The municipality works alongside organizations like PADF, JP/HRO, and Build Change while at the same growing its tax base.  Today, the commune of Delmas is used as a model of how a municipality can work with external partners to build trust with its citizens and grow its local revenue base.

As a country, Haiti uses international aid as the primary source for capital investments.  In the current budget for fiscal year 2017-18, 94% of the domestic resources (i.e., tax revenues) are allocated to operating expenses and 6% for capital expenditures.  Most of the budget is spent on operating expenses like salaries.  Conversely, this means that most of the capital investments we see happening are done by or with the support of international donors or with limited loans like the Petro Caribe program funded by the Venezuelan government.  Most donor countries, including Venezuela, that give grants will use their own consultants and require the purchase of goods from their manufacturers.  Objectively, this is logical and a strategy that is to be expected.  For example, it would be, at best, naive to expect that the US government would allow its money to be used for the purchase of a French-made Renault vehicle, or for the French to allow their taxpayer money to purchase a flight on American airlines.

Irrespective of one’s position, we can all agree that Haiti needs to strengthen its governance structures to respond to the people’s aspirations. To change the dynamics and increase our government’s ability to make demands on external actors will require that we clean our own house and apply rules and processes that are legitimate.  This starts, first and foremost, by respecting our own constitution, which calls for the inclusion of our citizens in the governance process. 

It would mean that by respecting our own laws there would be a local representative from the departmental assemblies coming from the indirect elections also called elections in the second degree.  This local representative has the constitutional right to sit in the ministerial council to ensure that local issues are represented in the debates, especially around budget time.  As the saying goes: you are either at the table or on the menu. Finally, it would mean respecting the budget process as outlined in the constitution to ensure that citizens are able to participate in setting priorities for their communities.

How Haiti Can Better Use Aid Dollars

One of the major complications in development is how International Aid is disbursed.  A 2012 study by the Center for Global Development found that “the Government of Haiti received just 1 percent of humanitarian aid and somewhere between15 and 21 percent of longer-term relief aid.” It found that “donors continue to be reluctant to fund the government. Valid concerns arise about the lack of capacity within the Haitian Government, as well as entrenched systems of patronage, corruption, and inefficiency. Yet government capacity will never be built or improved if donors continue to bypass local institutions in favor of NGOs.” This has been the most common reason put forward by the donor community to bypass Haitian organizations and institutions. 

To change the dynamics and our government’s ability to make demands on external actors will require that we clean our own house and apply rules and processes that are legitimate.  This starts, first and foremost, by respecting our own constitution, which calls for the inclusion of our citizens in the governance process.  This would ensure three things:

1. That there is compliance with our laws and regulations

1. That the public sector is efficient, and problems are identified, and dealt with timely and appropriately

1. That the state’s resources are used judiciously, and the work is an alignment with the role of the state and the expectations of the citizenry

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Indeed, respecting the process and our own laws would arm our elected representatives with the legitimacy when engaged in negotiations with international partners.  It would allow them to make demands, push back and even say no when it is not in the national interest.  If the administration had listened to the voices of the marginalized urban and rural poor, they would have known that the fuel increase was unacceptable.  They also would have had the cover to say “no” to the IMF’s request during the negotiations.

In my current role leading a leadership development organization, we teach people about community development.  This process starts by recognizing the existing assets within a community and more specifically within the people.  It is important to find the culprits of wrongdoing, past and present, but by nature as well as an occupational hazard, I am allergic with the idea of pointing fingers at how other people manage their resources when we are unwilling to responsibly manage our own.   Yes, France.  Yes, slavery. Yes, Duvalier. Yes, US occupations. Yes, yes, yes and yes BUT it is time that we claim ourselves and define our future. 

Conclusion

To summarize my view of the IC/NGO debate, we have to acknowledge the asymmetry that exists between Haiti and the donor community as well as NGO.  However, this state of affairs does not have to be permanent nor can it define who we are.  We have seen examples of Rwanda and Delmas that have been able to harness their own resources (people and money) and that of the international community and NGOs to achieve their own strategic goals.  Given our governance issues, it is also inevitable that partners will distrust our systems and processes (Haitians do as well) but despite any self-serving conclusion they may reach about Haiti, there is a necessity to put our house in order.   We must not allow this narrative to define our agency as free people who make good and bad choices but also assume its share of responsibilities.

While eliminating all aids is not the solution, ensuring its effective use can contribute to Haiti’s development but it [aid] will never be the long-term solution.  We need to understand that aid is a foreign policy tool that serves the commercial and/or political interests of the donor country. We need to use it for our own interests.  In the best circumstances, aid could help advance our development agenda but it can never and should never replace the rational utilization of our own resources. 

We Haitians must take the destiny of our country into our own hands.  It starts with recognizing the humanity in each other.  It includes good governance, transparency and requires a better allocation and rational utilization of the resources we do have: human capital and natural. It involves having a strategic plan but also the ability to coordinate its execution with rigor. More importantly, it requires sacrifices but also a shared accountability, which means the inclusion of the population at various levels as outlined in our constitution.  Given the level of mistrust within the nation, what is most vital to us as a nation is to respect the rule of law.

We have been and will always be a proud people and despite our history we can never allow any narrative that questions our agency to take hold.  We have agency, decency and dignity.  We are Haitians and we do have agency.

[1] Author Gerard Barthelmy judiciously sketched this point in his book “Haiti en Dehors”

The makings of a Haitian Faustian bargain

The makings of a Haitian Faustian bargain

In the 16th century medieval legend, Faust was a very successful scholar who was once idealistic but became disillusioned and bitter with despair. He decided to forsake God and made a contract with the devil in which he exchanged his soul in return for power and worldly gains.

As was the case with Faust, the Haitian social, economic and political elites have continued to enter into a similar agreement by forsaking what is right and selling the country’s soul piece by piece in exchange for power and worldly gains.  Our elected leaders openly use violence to reach the highest offices and once there they openly disregard the very constitution they had sworn to protect and uphold.  Justice is arbitrary and sold to the highest bidder.  The innocent lingers in prison while the guilty walks freely and proudly among us in society. Our institutions from the family to the schools, to the church to parliament, have all lost their last shred of credibility.  The country is left rudderless and drifting further out of control with each passing day.

At the root of these institutional fractures are the Faustian bargains that produce the disintegration, failed governance and never ending political crises.  In entering into these bargains, our hope has been that they might bring about peace and stability, and they often do offer glimpses of false hopes.  In the end, such hopes are not only short lived but they always lead to further disillusionment, despair and cynicism.  The most recent case of such a bargain is the agreement signed between the former President of the Republic, Michel Martelly and the Presidents of both Houses of Parliament. 

It [the agreement] allowed President Martelly to step down gracefully on February 7 as mandated by the constitution.  It also helped to avoid one political crisis but only in exchange for another, as such bargains often do.  To situate this agreement, it is important to reiterate that the requirement for the President to step down at the end of his term was never optional but always was a constitutional obligation.  In article 134.1 of the amended constitution it states that:

La durée du mandat présidentiel est de cinq (5) ans. Cette période commence et se terminera le 7 février suivant la date des élections.

 Further, it specifies in Article 134.3 that:

Le Président de la République ne peut bénéficier de prolongation de mandat. Il ne peut assumer un nouveau mandat, qu’après un intervalle de cinq (5) ans. En aucun cas, il ne peut briguer un troisième mandat.

In sum, these two articles define clearly the start and end date of a presidential term.  The constitution is just as clear on what should happen if a vacancy occurs during that term.  It stipulates in Article 149 the following:

En cas de vacance de la Présidence de la République soit par démission, destitution ou en cas d’incapacité physique ou mentale permanente dûment constatée, le Conseil des Ministres, sous la présidence du Premier Ministre, exerce le Pouvoir Exécutif jusqu’à l’élection d’un autre Président.

Dans ce cas, le scrutin pour l’élection du nouveau Président de la République pour le temps qui reste à courir a lieu soixante (60) jours au moins et cent vingt (120) jours au plus après l’ouverture de la vacance, conformément à la Constitution et à la loi électorale.

Dans le cas où la vacance se produit à partir de la quatrième année du mandat présidentiel, l’Assemblée Nationale se réunit d’office dans les soixante (60) jours qui suivent la vacance pour élire un nouveau Président Provisoire de la République pour le temps qui reste à courir.

Unfortunately, the constitution has no provision for what happens when a vacancy occurs because elections were not organized to elect a successor to the President. Therefore, on February 8^th, Haiti’s leaders were faced with a presidential void and a constitutional dilemma.  In a country with the rule of law, which Haiti is not, this would have been an interesting legal issue to be resolved by the constitutional court or the court of cassation. Instead, through a slight of hand and unlike previous tripartite agreements (for example, the December 29, 2014 agreement to extend the mandates of the deputies) the former President of the Republic and the Presidents of both Houses of Parliament signed an agreement as representatives of two of the three co-depositories of the national sovereignty.  Through the same magic trick, the judicial branch, which is the third co-depositor of our national sovereignty in this equation, vanished like the old magic trick of the white rabbit in the deep black hat. 

This should not be worth noting but the constitution establishes three major branches of government--legislative, executive, and judicial as stated in Article 59:

Les citoyens délèguent l’exercice de la souveraineté nationale à trois (3) pouvoirs: le pouvoir législatif; le pouvoir exécutif; le pouvoir judiciaire.

Yet, despite having unconstitutionally discarded the judicial branch, to bolster their bargain the executive and the legislative branches cynically went to great lengths in referencing 14 constitutional articles as its legal framework.  Worst, they presented and sold the agreement to the public as if it was on equal footing (pari passu) as the constitution and used it to convene the national assembly who would subsequently elect the provisional President.

In fact, the agreement was just that – an agreement that had no real legal basis even as it served a singular political purpose and that was to find a way out of the immediate problem posed by the presidential vacancy.  With further cynicism, even as they signed the agreement, the parties knew that it could never lead to a permanent solution or even get fully implemented within the proposed timeline.  The agreement was a limited political tool and it certainly could not under no circumstances take precedence over the constitution.  As a result and as was expected, it is today at the center of deeper disagreements and the basis of controversies pertaining to the timing of the second round of elections and the provisional President’s term in office, which it is argued should end by May 14.  Sadly, what is not being discussed is whether President Martelly could engage the executive in such a deal, and whether President Privert and Chancy had the mandate from the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies respectively to enter into such an agreement on their behalf.  It is also not clear whether the national assembly --made up of the senate and chamber of deputies-- subsequently ratified the agreement as required by the Assembly's own internal rules.

The antagonists in this new tragic political drama are making two arguments. The first, which buttresses the second, is an issue of ethics. It is used to question whether Mr. Privert who signed the agreement on behalf of the senate should have been able to benefit from it.  This is a rather sophisticated argument to at best undermine the President’s legitimacy and at worst weaken how the public perceives him.  The second and more forceful argument is that the agreement is legally binding and must be applied (pacta sunt servanda) at any cost even when the dates that were agreed upon have long expired. 

To understand and evaluate the arguments being made, they must be taken apart.  First, it is important to note that as a legal matter senator Privert (and deputy Chancy for that matter) signed the agreement as a representatives or proxies for the senate and chamber, and not as individuals.  This is analogous to a manager signing a contract on behalf of the business for which he works or a president signing an international treaty on behalf of his country.  In these contexts, the engagement is institutional rather than personal.

Once that task was completed, there weren’t ethical issues that prohibited senator Privert (as a citizen and even a senator) to present his candidacy for the post of President.  Moreover, the Senate’s permanent committee on ethics and corruption is responsible for dealing with the ethical issues, if indeed there were any.  Instead, the senate accepted senator Privert’s candidature.  Once he passed that test then Article 135 of the constitution came into play, which outlines the eligibility requirements to be president.  In a normal country, one should have the confidence that the national assembly verified that Mr. Privert met the constitutional requirements and in this case we will assume that that was done.  Finally, the assembly proceeded to hold a debate about the candidates for the post, which resulted in a vote and the subsequent election of Mr. Privert as Haiti's provisional President, and in accordance with Article 135.1 he took the oath of office before the assembly.  From that point on, the only relevant articles are from 136 to 154, which outline the powers of the President.

The second and more difficult question is on the length of the provisional term.  Since the constitution doesn’t provide any guidance on the question of what should happen when a President cannot be replaced because elections were not organized to elect a successor, the parliament was left without any legal reference.  Given the legal void, they could have looked at the precedence set from previous transitions (e.g., Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, 1990 or Boniface Alexandre, 2004).  Instead, they decided to use article 149.3, which is applicable only when a vacancy is duly declared because of the President’s resignation, dismissal, death or in case of physical or mental permanent incapacity.  In that case, the article requires that “…the Council of Ministers, under the presidency of the Prime Minister, exercises the Executive Power until the election of another President.”   It also compelled the National Assembly to meet within sixty (60) days after the vacancy to elect a new Provisional President of the Republic for the time left to run.  These provisions in article 149.3 were ignored.  

The assembly’s contempt for the constitution and its disdain for the judicial branch’s role in interpreting it make its decisions arbitrary, and it’s choices unconstitutional and legally unenforceable.

The solution to the this crisis as it was for the ones that came before will inevitably require a political agreement based on the articulation of greater social cohesion between the masses and Haiti’s social, political and economic elites.  The international community, which undoubtedly had a hand in our getting to this point, understands the political and legal predicament all too well.  They understand the potential risk for this political confrontation to converge with the deepening economic crisis and how the vacuum of leadership could spiral into violence that would threaten regional stability.  The containment of such a crisis would require a deeper and more visible international intervention – an unacceptable option.  Indeed, such an outcome would particularly upset the United States’ hegemonic foreign policy strategy but also its internal politics during a particular caustic presidential campaign. More importantly, for the foreign policy makers that make up the core group, the potential images on CNN of bodies on the streets of Port-au-Prince or the flows of refugees heading to the shores of Florida and other neighboring countries would lay bare their strategic failures in a tiny place and seemingly backward place like Haiti.

The members of the core group want to avoid any major civil unrest and are therefore using all of their political influence to see that elections are held as quickly as possible – the truth and certainly Haiti’s sovereignty be damned.  The recent show of force by the core group and the US representatives in the Haitian parliament is evidence of the state of panic that must have gripped them and for the second time in a row they have shown their hands and lost. Unfortunately, they have not understood the limit of their power and influence, which has diminished significantly as a result of their continued undiplomatic intrusion into Haiti’s internal affairs and their political meddling in the last elections.  The decline in how most Haitians view the US’ role as a mediator is the result of  its intervention in the last election and was consolidated after Mr. Opont, the former president of the provisional electoral council, admitted that the international community falsified the 2011 election results.

It is not clear what will happen on May 14 (or June 14 if based on the agreed 120 days limit) when President Privert’s term comes to an end in accordance to the agreement.  At the same time, it is quite evident that this parliament does not have the moral legitimacy to play a positive role in such a historical moment nor will it have the legal tool to remove the provisional President from office, who also has no such legitimacy and has not made any effort to gain it either.  Sadly for the country and maybe rightly for the parliament, in this game of chicken it could become the victim of its own choices to blatantly and consistently disregard the law and to act with contempt for the constitution. The greater good is never part of the equation for our political leaders as this crisis and countless others throughout Haiti’s history have shown.  Instead, they are expanding time and energy on an agreement that they all know is unenforceable or at best enforceable by force instead of the law.   

However, what is clear is that we, the concerned citizens, can either sit back and watch the country continue its descent into hell or we can step up and provide the leadership necessary to change the course of our own history.  What is clear is that our silence, indifference and ignorance is complicit in our own self-destruction, and in them our political and economic elites have found tacit approval to continue to rape and pillage the country’s coffers and meager resources.

It may be a fact that most Haitians do not know where to turn and are too tired or too scared to demand changes in our politics.  Nonetheless, unless we rise up, we will continue to be the victims of the next gas station that goes up in flames, the next out of control truck whose breaks fail and destroy and maim along the way, the next bridge collapse, the next flood, the next fire for which there are no fire trucks,  the next road accident for which there are no ambulances or hospitals to provide medical care and the victim of the next robbery after leaving a bank for which noone will be caught and punished.  We will be the ones who continue to suffer the big and small indignities of three to four-hour long traffic jams, and not have access to the basic services like water, electricity, healthcare, and receive bad services from the phone companies, the banks and the rampant system of corruption in the provisioning of public services. We are the ones who pay the price for the permanent instability and the indignities of being stopped by UN soldiers and foreign ambassadors in our parliament.  Indeed, our silence is the fuel that feeds the system of corruption and instability.

We have come to loathe the concept of politic when in reality it is the lifeblood of an organized society.  Politic is define in Wikipedia as “the process of making uniform decisions applying to all members of a group and involves the use of power by one person to affect the behavior of another person.”  We may be correct in our disdain for lowly politicians who see politic as the only path toward social mobility and ensure their own financial security.  However, our absence from politics does not absolve us from our responsibilities as citizens or from our right and obligation to demand an end to impunity and a return to the rule of law and constitutional order.  In principle, elections are supposed to be the way in which citizens exercise these rights and responsibilities, and select as well as sanction their representatives.  However, as a right that can be exercised every four to five years, election is simply not powerful enough to affect the systemic change we need.  

It is also evident that individually we cannot take on the huge political-bureaucratic machine that is the government.  Moreover, the political process can overwhelm even the most well organized society but all is not lost for Haiti. In part, the solution will require that concerned citizens (abroad and in Haiti) finally understand that democracy is not a spectator sport.  We need to expand our social capital and act towards the common long-term interest or perish alone. This will require that we have the courage to step into the public square and engage in the debates on the major social and political issues of the day. 

We must speak out when our leaders step out of acceptable norms or act outside the law.  It can start by applying social pressure to demand that public officials abide by and conform to the rule of law.  It begins with a parliament that respects the constitution and police officers who obey the law.  We must use the law but also the court of public opinion to pressure and punish public officials like judges who accept bribes to release thieves, rapists, murderers and kidnappers back into society.  We must fulfill the responsibility to pay our taxes and use our right to demand access to basic services like clean streets and the fair application of the law.  We must leverage the social forces to compel our politicians and civil servants to follow the rules and respond to our demands. 

An essential part is, therefore, social mobilization –though not necessarily street protests— to convert our numerical, moral and intellectual strengths into genuine bargaining power.  Furthermore, we can use technology, work with the independent media and civil society organizations to promote public disclosure, conduct citizen-based budget analysis, service benchmarking, and program impact assessments to make the government more transparent and accountable.  More importantly, we must demand a break up of the monopolies, especially the ones held by a merchant class that has no allegiance to Haiti or its citizens except as customers.

In summary, the currently brewing constitutional and electoral crisis is not new but all the elements are in place to explode into civil unrest or even a civil war.  It is a scenario that the international community cannot accept as it would lay bare their own failure but also one that we, as citizens cannot accept as it would spell the final disintegration of our nation.  

The solution that has always existed is to step up, unite our forces and leverage our social capital to engage in a national dialogue in order to create a social contract that includes all Haitians.  In the horizon is the outline for deep civil unrest by a restless and frustrated population.  The international community has clearly shown its hand and is no longer viewed as a fair mediator, if it ever was.  Our civic engagement and political participation offer the only possible exit out of this new man-made crisis.  They also offer a new opportunity to strengthen our democracy, hold our leaders accountable and create a country in which the rule of law is finally a reality for all of its citizens.  The moral voice of organized society is the essential tool for obtaining fair elections, clean streets and respect for our basic rights.  We must become soldiers in the war against impunity, corruption, hunger and an education system that zombifies our children and destroys any hope for our shared future.

The trap of the Faustian deal is that the signers become corrupted and trapped, and the expected benefits are always compromised and short-lived.  The parliament has sold Haiti’s soul piecemeal to the devil for power but “for what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?” 

Process really matters...

Process really matters...

The protests that had brought life to a standstill have stopped and things seem to have resumed to some eerie level of normalcy.  This sense of return to normalcy is the result of the selection of Haiti's new provisional President, Mr. Privet by the National Assembly.  However, the astute observers of social and political movements in Haiti know that this is only the quiet before the storm.  

Among the many possibilities that one can reasonably anticipate, two outcomes seem to be the likeliest results from this crooked and awkward process.  The first is that President Privert will find a way to remain in power or have someone close to him be elected, although he will do so more elegantly than the way President Martelly attempted it.  President Privert also has a window of opportunity to push through some policies even in the short period that he will be in office.  This will happen for two reasons: (a) the population is tired, and more than anything it needs peace, security and stability; (b) the country's economic indicators are in a dismal state.  Indeed, this year's crops are nearly all lost due to diseases, a terrible drought which was followed by floods.  As a result, local food production will be an at all time low and conversely prices will hit an all-time high.  Moreover, inflation is hovering just above 13%, the gourde is exchanging at 63 to 1 US dollar.  The working class and especially the poor --their rank has increased to over 1.5 million-- are being squeezed from all sides (the devalue of their income and increase in prices for basic necessities).  This vulnerable population will continue to experience a precipitous decline in its quality of life that is vertiginous at the speed at which it is happening.  The policy makers are either unable and/or unwilling to tackle these challenges.

The second potential outcome from this process is that the so-called agreement will not and cannot be respected because the parties will not come to any agreement on how to divvy up the loot.  The outcome is predictable: the protests will start back up and the social instability will worsen.  At the root of it all is our consistent and insistent unwillingness to deal with the fundamental rules of nation building and the total disrespect for the laws of the land.  Parenthetically, it must be said that our friends in the international community continue to support our “leaders” as the latter continue to find new and ever more creative ways to trample on the Haitian constitution.  This support is based on their own needs to have an "elected" counterpart regardless of how this counterpart got to power so output has taken more importance than the process.  We wallow in uncertainty, despite the fact that the sectors seem to have accepted the outcome, because we continue to operate in a state of de facto instead of looking for a solution that has a basis de jure.  

Process is important and determinant: the process through which President Privert was elected, I believe, was extraconstitutional and the truce obtained from such a process can only be short-lived. It is universally understood that the outcome of any election is deemed legitimate based on the process that was used. In the case of Haiti, the way in which the provisional President was elected was, to say the least, opaque and obtuse.  Indeed, in the best of times the legitimacy of the winner from an election and whether said winner is contested or not is largely dependent on the transparency and fairness of the electoral process.  The process itself is values-laden and it gains its legitimacy on the possibilities that exist for citizens to affect public policy in a symbiotic interaction between the political leadership and public opinion that is constant.  Thus, the absence of such a process results in dysfunctions and handicaps the state's ability to play its primary role, which is to work for the common good of society.  In essence, circumventing the process will result in the collapse of social order.

As it became clear that the elections could not continue and in fact would be cancelled, many organizations from various sectors offered suggestions on how to resolve the impending constitutional crisis (i.e., President’s Martelly’s departure without a replacement).  Those suggestions could be summarized into three categories: (1) those who advocated for a member of the supreme court to become the provisional President; (2) those who advocated for the President of the national assembly to fill the post; and finally (3) those who advocated for the council of ministers presided by the Prime Minister.

The election of Mr. Privert as provisional President was an unanticipated surprise that has provided a much-needed reprieve from the constant protests but the underlying issues, which are in fact broader than the elections, remain unchanged.  And despite this reprieve, it is evident that the process that brought President Privert to power limits his ability to enforce the constitution of the republic.  Again, while we often operate in de facto fashions, many fundamental questions remain unanswered in the national consciousness.  For example, how can a President who was elected outside of the constitution and without a broad agreement asks other parties to now respect the constitution?  How can a decried parliament that was supposed to take office on the second Monday of February but instead did so on the second Sunday in a flagrant disregard for the constitution live up to their oath of office?  Finally, how can a supreme court whose members were unconstitutionally placed on the court by the executive now rule on constitutional questions?  These questions are vivid illustrations of why process matters more than output and sometimes even outcomes.

In the absence of the rule of law – a necessary condition for establishing a strong democracy – and given the constitution’s silence on the issue of a Presidential vacancy, resulting from an annulled election, I had argued for the application of a hybrid resolution.  It would have included representatives from the courts, the national assembly and civil society.  The reasoning behind this approach was two-fold.  First, all three branches of government suffer from a deficiency of legitimacy.  Second, given the complexity of the challenges ahead, it seems wiser to share the load and have each representative hold a specific portfolio.  I believe that a deliberative and constructivist approach is necessary in order to reach any kind of viable solution.  Such an approach would give primacy to the “process” of forming a new government rather than the output; i.e., having someone in the Presidential office.  Additionally, this process would have been contingent upon the imperative of a broader outreach and debate upon which we could develop a consensus on the type of society, country, government and President we should have.  In the best of times these are extremely lofty goals so even if we are able to achieve one of them through a deliberative process, it would be considered a “win.”

As a starting point, President Privert’s engagement with the various sectors is a good sign even though the diaspora, whose remittances account for nearly 25 per cent of the country's GDP, has once again been excluded.  Nonetheless, these engagements are insufficient and the process too exclusive to achieve any sustainable result.  Indeed, an "unelected" provisional President holding individual and disparate talks will not yield the national consensus we need.  President Privert will inevitably overreach his mandate and the push back will inevitably be hard and fast. We must not allow ourselves to be lull into a false sense of security.  Despite the siren songs of a resolution on the cheap, we will pay the piper sooner or later because process is an important ingredient for building confidence in a social and political context that is rife with mistrust and uncertainty.  But yet again, the President and more importantly the country has an opportunity to use this transition as an opportunity.  The tasks ahead for the public sector are to respond to the population’s desiderata, and to rebuild the public trust by applying good governance principles and following the law.  Our task as citizen is to advocate, demand and push for our leaders to do the right thing this time.  That means following a transparent process to tackle the foundational issues and leads to fair elections and having elected officials who are accountable to the people.

Haiti’s current state of affairs is classical and the results are foreseeable: the country will fall back into chaos if we continue to circumvent an accountable and transparent process in public policy making.  This outcome is not inevitable but it requires the commitment from all concerned citizens to engage in the country’s social and political life.  We can no longer afford to turn our gaze.  We must demand a change in the status quo if not for social cohesion but at the very least for our self-preservation.  In other words, even if we are not looking out for the well-being of the other –though we should, the fulfillment of our selfish needs, happiness and security is inextricably linked and intricately dependent on our neighbor’s ability to meet his basic needs.  We hold the key to the door of our destiny and cannot afford to turn it over to unworthy politicians. The time for the concerned citizens to be heard is now. Our disinterest will cause us to all drown in the cries and tears of the masses and that will be at our perils and evolved into its own process, and we will not like what it brings.